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This Article concerns unavoidably dangerous products and how
courts should handle the injuries they cause. Unavoidably dangerous
products are products that injure a certain percentage of those who
use them competently and that cannot be made safe.' In other words,
a certain percentage of the nonnegligent consumers of these products
will be injured by them, and there is no way either to reduce the num-
bers of those who will be injured or to predict who they will be.2
There are three basic categories of products that contain unavoid-
able dangers. Products in these three categories are dangerous when
competently used; by definition, there is no alternative reasonable de-
sign that would eliminate the danger.3 These three categories are as
follows:
(1) dangerous products the utility of which outweighs their dangers
and which are available and in use for the good of society generally
(such as vaccines); 4
(2) dangerous products the utility of which outweighs their dangers
and which are available and in use as needed by certain members of
* Professor, Villanova University School of Law. B.A., J.D., Yale University. I am in-
debted to David Antczak for his energetic and enthusiastic assistance in the writing of this
Article.
1. See Marc Z. Edell, Risk Utility Analysis of Unavoidably Unsafe Products, 17 SETON
HALL L. REV. 623, 640 n.86 (1987); Joseph A. Page, Generic Product Risks: The Case Against
Comment k and for Strict Tort Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 853 (1983). The Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts recognizes the existence of certain products that cannot be made safe for normal
use. RESTATEMENT (SEcONrD) OF TORTS § 402A cmts. i, k (1965). The overwhelming majority
of jurisdictions have adopted section 402A for products liability cases. See WILLIAM L. PROSSER
ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 717 (9th ed. 1994).
2. The policy concerns that are raised in this Article and the proposals that are suggested
are not intended to apply to those consumers who are injured by unavoidably dangerous prod-
ucts as a result of consumer misuse of the product or consumer negligence. See Maiorino v.
Weco Prods. Co., 214 A.2d 18, 20 (N.J. 1965) (holding that misuse of product bars recovery
under strict products liability theory); see also Fleming James, Jr., General Products-Should
Manufacturers Be Liable Without Negligence?, 24 TENN. L. REV. 923, 926 (1957) ("[T]his does
not mean that the maker would be held for all injuries caused by his products."); Page Keeton,
Products Liability-Liability Without Fault and the Requirement of a Defect, 41 TEx. L. REV.
855, 858 (1963) (stating that consumer is responsible for injury resulting from product misuse).
3. For a discussion of the propriety of admitting or requiring evidence of an alternative
reasonable design in design defect cases, see infra notes 75-77, 80 and accompanying text.
4. See discussion infra Part II.
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society (such as ladders and prescription medications other than
vaccines); 5 and
(3) dangerous products the dangers of which outweigh their utility
(such as cigarettes). 6
The problem posed by the first two of these categories is that the
products in these categories are not defective.7 They pass any applica-
ble cost-benefit test-their utility outweighs their costs. Thus, as the
law now stands there is no basis for imposing liability on their manu-
facturers for injuries caused by them because manufacturers are only
liable for products which are defective, that is, that fail the applicable
risk-utility test.8
The fact that these products are not defective means that those
who are injured in the course of using them nonnegligently are not
compensated for their injuries. This is highly unfair to those injured
by these products. These injured consumers are compelled to pay for
the availability of these products and for the benefit that society re-
ceives from their use (first category) or for the benefit of those who
need the products involved (second category). There is no way for
them to avoid injury; these products inevitably injure a certain per-
centage (albeit low) of those who use them nonnegligently.
The utility of a product outweighs its dangers when it is suffi-
ciently useful or necessary to make the price of its availability, in
terms of the injuries it causes, less than its utility to those who benefit
from its presence on the market. It seems highly unfair to allow this
price to fall on those who happen to be among the unfortunates in-
jured by the product and to allow those who benefit from its availabil-
ity to avoid paying the costs of that availability.
The answer is straightforward: The fact that the products in the
first two categories are not defective should not foreclose compensa-
tion for those injured by them. In other words, where consumers are
5. See discussion infra Part I1.
6. See discussion infra Part IV.
7. Courts have created various methods for ascertaining "defectiveness". See, e.g., Cater-
pillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 883-85 (Alaska 1979) (risk-utility analysis); Seattle-First
Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 542 P.2d 774, 779 (Wash. 1975) (consumer expectations test). Each method
inevitably involves a cost-benefit test. See Aller v. Rodgers Mach. Mfg. Co., 268 N.W.2d 830, 835
(Iowa 1978) (conducting cost-benefit test with consumer expectations test); Page Keeton, Prod-
uct Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30, 39 (1973) ("[Tihere is no way to
avoid a risk-benefit analysis in passing upon designs.").
8. A manufacturer is held liable if the product in question is defective; a product is defec-
tive when its costs outweigh its benefits. See Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033, 1039
(Or. 1974). The distinction between such a balancing test and a negligence inquiry is that the test
focuses on the nature of product rather than the reasonableness of the manufacturer's behavior.
See id. at 1037; Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., Inc., 709 P.2d 876, 880-81 (Ariz. 1985).
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injured in the name of the greater good of society, or of a substantial
portion thereof, those consumers should be fully compensated for
their suffering. Both the justification for this position and the mecha-
nism of recovery are the subjects of this Article.
The products in the first two categories set forth above are not
defective because they pass any applicable risk-utility test. The prod-
ucts in the third category, on the other hand, are defective because
their utility is outweighed by their costs. With respect to this third
category, the Article contends that, as defective products, 9 these prod-
ucts should simply be treated like any other defective products. In
other words, the absence of an alternative reasonable design should
have no impact upon the application of strict products liability law to
these products.' 0 If they fail the cost-benefit test, they are defective
and should be treated as such.
I. Ti UNAVOIDABLE BACKGROUND AND ON BEYOND DEFECT
Strict products liability doctrine first explicitly appeared in the
1950s, and represented a change in the focus of the law." Simply put,
9. These products fail a strict products liability cost-benefit analysis. See discussion infra
Part IV. As a result, they are defective. See supra note 8. Under the rules of strict products
liability, therefore, the manufacturers of these defective products are responsible for the injuries
that the products cause. See supra note 8.
10. For a discussion of the requirement of an alternative reasonable design and other rea-
sons why courts have denied recovery to the injured users of these low-utility products, see infra
notes 75-77, 80 and accompanying text.
11. Prior to this time, tort law was widely accepted as a means of regulating the manner in
which individuals behaved by forcing the blameworthy to compensate the injured. See 2
FOWLER V. HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS § 12.1, at 744 (1956); Mary J.
Davis, Design Defect Liability: In Search of a Standard of Responsibility, 39 WAYNE L. REV.
1217, 1226-27 & n.28 (1993) (citing OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 77-80
(Little, Brown & Co., ed. 1923) (1881)). This view was heavily influenced by the laissez faire
philosophy of the industrial revolution that sought not to inhibit dangerous yet useful activity.
See HARPER & JAMES, supra, § 12.3, at 752; Davis, supra, at 1226 n.28. As a result, the belief
that tort liability could not attach without the existence of fault prevailed. See HARPER &
JAMES, supra, § 12.1, at 744; e.g., Ives v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., 94 N.E. 431, 439-41 (N.Y. 1911)
(ruling that worker's compensation statute imposing liability without fault is unconstitutional).
This view consequently affected the tort law in those particular cases that involved product-
related injuries. As a result, a plaintiff seeking compensation for losses caused by a product
needed to assert (and prove) that the manufacturer was at least negligent. See, e.g., Goullon v.
Ford Motor Co., 44 F.2d 310 (6th Cir. 1930) (plaintiff alleging negligent manufacture of tractor
steering wheel); Richenbacher v. California Packing Corp., 145 N.E. 281 (Mass. 1924) (plaintiff
alleging negligent placement of glass in spinach can).
By the 1950s, however, significant criticism of fault-based liability for personal injury arose.
See HARPER & JAMES, supra, § 12.4, at 752-58; Charles 0. Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to
Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. REV. 359, 361-70 (1951); James, supra note 2, at 923-27. Commen-
tators such as Professor James were primarily concerned with the often grave societal conse-
quences of serious injuries. See James, supra note 2, at 923. This concern led to a shift in the
focus of personal injury law. James argued that fault-based liability should be abandoned be-
cause it inadequately served the goal of compensating the injured. See HARPER & JAMES, supra,
1996]
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strict products liability represents a commitment to the idea that the
manufacturer of a product should pay for the injuries caused by the
product even if the manufacturer was not negligent in the design or
marketing of the product.12 Instead of requiring that the plaintiff
prove negligence on the part of the manufacturer in order to recover,
strict products liability took the position that the consumer should re-
cover for his or her injuries even if the manufacturer exercised "all
due care" in developing and marketing the product.13
Uncovering the purpose behind strict products liability is vital to
an understanding of the doctrine, because "where the reason stops,
there stops the rule."'1 4 Conversely, the rule should extend to all cases
which the reason covers. If the rationale behind the adoption of strict
products liability applies in a given arena, strict products liability
should as well.
If the purpose of strict products liability was to increase product
safety, the doctrine would be in large part unnecessary. 15 This is be-
§ 12.4, at 754-55. In the area of product-related injuries, James specifically advocated the elimi-
nation of the requirement of blameworthiness through imposition of a strict liability system that
would better accomplish the goal of compensating injured consumers and bystanders. See id.
§ 28.15, at 1569; James, supra note 2, at 923-24, 927.
Arguments such as those raised by Professor James suggesting the need for alternatives to
fault-based liability gained wider acceptance throughout the 1950s and were joined with the
contention that the manufacturer of a product should be held accountable for the harm that the
product causes. See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 84, at 506 (2d
ed. 1955) (indicating that "social policy demands that the burden of accidental injuries caused by
defective chattels be placed upon the producer"). Indeed, Dean Prosser, the Reporter to the
Restatement (Second) that would later codify strict products liability in tort, concluded by 1960
that the principle of liability solely based upon fault was "out of date in this day and generation."
William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J.
1099, 1122 (1960). The commentary of prominent legal scholars such as James and Prosser
helped to provide the impetus for change in products liability law that was later realized in the
1960s.
12. See James, supra note 2, at 927 ("[T]he risk of loss from dangerously defective products
would be put upon (and distributed by) the producer rather than upon the consumer or innocent
bystander, even where the producer is also innocent."). For a discussion of the policy goals
served by this doctrine, see infra notes 18-25 and accompanying text.
13. This approach to products liability was incorporated in the Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 402A and subsequently adopted in the majority of jurisdictions. RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 402A(2)(a) (1965) ("The rule... applies although ... the seller has exercised
all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product .....
14. K.N. LLEWELLYN, TE BRAMBLE BUSH 189 (1960).
15. Some courts and commentators have mistakenly concluded that strict products liability
doctrine exists primarily to encourage the manufacture of safer products. See, e.g., Nesselrode v.
Executive Beechcraft, Inc., 707 S.W.2d 371, 375 (Mo. 1986) ("The core concern in strict tort
liability law is safety."); Hoven v. Kelble, 256 N.W.2d 379, 389 (Wis. 1977) (quoting Harry
Kalven, Jr., Tort Law-Tort Watch, 34 J. AM. TRIAL LAW. Ass'N 1, 57 (1972)) ("[L]iability is
imposed in the quest for safety and accident prevention .. "); see also William A. Worthington,
The "Citadel" Revisited: Strict Tort Liability and the Policy of Law, 36 S. TEx. L. REv. 227, 258




cause a manufacturer who has failed to adopt an existing product fea-
ture to make its product safe has acted unreasonably, and therefore
negligently. 16 Negligence-based liability suffices to insure that such a
manufacturer pays for its errors. 17 If the purpose of the doctrine were
to deter other forms of manufacturer misconduct, there would be no
need to make it a fault-free basis of recovery. So the goal of strict
products liability must lie elsewhere.
All the evidence points to strict products liability as combining a
fairness and economic set of goals. The economic goal is to spread
the costs of injuries among users of a product by holding the manufac-
turer liable for the injuries that its product causes.18 If the manu-
facturer is held liable in this way, the manufacturer will raise
the costs of the product and pass the costs of injuries caused
by a product on to all users of that product.'9 But why spread
The position that strict products liability exists primarily to provide an incentive for en-
hanced safety has given those who are opposed to strict liability ammunition in their quest for its
abolition. Proponents of a return to fault-based liability have argued that strict products liability
should be abandoned because the doctrine does not efficiently promote safety. If this were the
primary reason for the doctrine, the assertion that the doctrine should be abandoned because of
its failure to promote product safety would have some merit. See, e.g., William Powers, Jr., A
Modest Proposal to Abandon Strict Products Liability, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv. 639,644 n.18, 644-45.
Professor Powers notes that negligence is the appropriate standard for optimizing product safety.
See id. at 644 n.18. He takes this position in the context of his argument that one of the main
purposes of strict products liability-promoting product safety-has been undermined. See id.
If, on the other hand, strict products liability is not primarily motivated by a concern for
enhanced product safety, the fact that it is not necessary for this purpose does not justify aban-
doning it.
16. See, e.g., Metzgar v. Playskool, Inc., 30 F.3d 459 (3d Cir. 1994). Metzgar involved the
choking death of a child on a toy block. Id. at 460. The case involved both negligent and strict
liability design defect claims. See id. In addressing the negligence issue, however, the court
focused upon whether the toy manufacturer acted unreasonably in its design choice by failing to
modify the toy block's design so as to eliminate the toy's foreseeable choking potential. See id.
at 462.
17. See Davis, supra note 11, at 1223 (stating that negligence-based liability evaluates deci-
sion-making of manufacturers).
18. This goal is based upon the premise that society as a whole suffers more economically
when individuals must bear the full burden of their losses and face potential financial ruin. See
HARPER & JAMES, supra note 11, § 13.2, at 763 & n.7. As a result, distribution of the costs of
injury among all consumers of a particular product prevents the serious repercussions of individ-
ual disaster. See id.; see also Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law
of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499, 517 (1961) (contending that it is preferable to charge all consumers a
small price increase than to allow one injured consumer to suffer substantial damages).
19. See Calabresi, supra note 18, at 505. Judge Calabresi argued that "the loss should be
placed on the party which is most likely to cause the burden to be reflected in the price ...."
Thus, the imposition of liability on the manufacturer is not grounded in a conclusion that the
manufacturer is at fault. Rather, in accordance with Judge Calabresi's argument, holding the
manufacturer liable places the costs on the party that can most easily alter the product's price to
distribute those costs. See id.; see also Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841, 849 (5th
Cir. 1967) ("[M]anufacturers are superior risk-bearers because they have the capacity to dis-
tribute the losses of the few to the many by the price mechanism."); PROSSER, supra note 11,
§ 84, at 506 ("[The producer] is best able to distribute the risk to the general public by means of
1996]
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the costs at all? Why not let the loss remain where it initially
lands? 20
Prior to the development of strict products liability, of course, the
costs of injury would fall on the injured party, and would remain there
in the absence of some fault to justify transferring the cost to the man-
ufacturer. There are those who advocate that this result be rein-
stated.21 Even though the manufacturer in a strict liability suit cannot
be said to have been at fault in the negligence sense, however, that
manufacturer is still responsible for the presence of the product on the
market in the form in which it was sold. The manufacturer has made
the decisions about designing, labelling, and marketing the product,
and has made the product. Strict liability was designed to compel the
manufacturer to stand behind its product, a justification that has noth-
ing whatsoever to do with negligence. The true costs of a product
include the costs of the injuries it causes. Strict products liability law
advocates the result that a nonnegligent consumer should be compen-
sated for the injuries caused by products, even where the manufac-
turer has not been negligent.
Thus, under strict products liability law, the loss does not remain
on the consumer. Simply put, leaving the loss on the consumer is un-
fair.22 The manufacturer has designed, made, and marketed the prod-
prices and insurance."); MARK C. RAHDERT, COVERING ACCIDENT COSTS: INSURANCE, LIABIL-
rrY, AND TORT REFORM 28-35 (1995) (elaborating factors involved in an "insurance rationale"
for tort liability).
20. See David G. Owen, The Moral Foundations of Products Liability Law: Toward First
Principles, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 427, 451 (1993), who essentially advocates such a result for
faultless injuries. Professor Owen contends that imposing liability upon a faultless party for
another's injury is an inequitable policy decision that favors the injured party's interests at the
faultless party's expense. See id. at 449. However, when the costs of a product-related injury are
shifted to a faultless manufacturer, the economic process of strict products liability does not
come to a halt there. Instead, the manufacturer then distributes the burden through price altera-
tion to those who benefit from the product's availability. See supra notes 18-19 and accompany-
ing text.
Owen claims that freedom and equality necessitate his conclusion that strict liability is inap-
propriate. See Owen, supra, at 452-53. In particular, he insists that such principles require that
the victims of faultless product injuries bear the costs as "background risks" of life. See id. at
451. This determination ignores the notions of fairness that underlie and affirm the doctrine of
strict products liability. See infra notes 23-25, 29 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
fairness justification for the doctrine.
21. See, e.g., Owen, supra note 20.
22. Strict products liability doctrine centers around a desire to lessen the social problems
that are created when victims of unpredictable and often inevitable product-related injuries go
uncompensated. See Helene Curtis, 385 F.2d at 848 ("Americans now enjoy the conveniences of
many modem and beneficial products. These benefits to the many, however, have come at a
high cost to a few."); HARPER & JAMES, supra note 11, § 13.2, at 762 ("[The injuries] bring[ ]
great hardship upon the victims themselves and cause[ ] unfortunate repercussions to society as a
whole."); K.N. Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society: II, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 341, 404
(1937) (arguing that limitations on warranty liability to unwholesome food products ignore the
[Vol. 72:189
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uct, and profits from its availability. Why, then, should the risk of loss
shift to the consumer? The answer is that the risk should remain with
the manufacturer, just as the profits of the product do.
The thought which underlies [strict liability] law is not that the de-
fendant has not conformed to norms of reasonably careful behavior
respecting his own activities that secondarily, though perhaps inevi-
tably, affect the life or property of another. It is the fact that he has
deliberately chosen to cast his loss or the risk of loss onto another.
It may be that defendant was wholly innocent in his appropriation
of plaintiffs interest. Nevertheless, he must pay for deliberately as-
signing risk of loss to another in damages appropriate to his "wrong-
ful" conduct.
23
Thus, as the party responsible for the product, the manufacturer
should pay for the injuries it causes.24 The costs of the injuries result-
ing from its availability are part of the costs of the product itself. Any
calculation which fails to take such costs into account allows the man-
ufacturer to reap the benefits of the product without having to con-
front its costs. 25
Thus, the first reason for a strict products liability approach is
that fairness requires that manufacturers stand behind their products.
Once this concept is adopted, other aspects of strict products liability
follow. In a strict products liability case, the plaintiff need not prove
"helpless consumer... who takes what he gets, because he does not know enough, technically, to
test even what is before his eyes.").
23. Thomas A. Cowan, Some Policy Bases of Products Liability, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1077,
1088-89 (1965).
24. See Lartigue v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19, 36 (5th Cir. 1963) ("Public
policy demands that the burden of any accidental injuries caused by such products be placed
upon those who produce and market the products... The consumer of such products is entitled
to a maximum of protection .... ); see also Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 402 N.E. 2d 194, 202
(Ill. 1980) (Moran, J., concurring and dissenting) (stating that the manufacturer should be "held
answerable for injuries to someone for whom its product is intended, who uses it in the manner
in which it was intended to be used, and whose injuries were proximately caused by an inherent
danger in the product of which the user was unaware"); HARPER & JAMES, supra note 11,
§ 28.16, at 1573 (advocating manufacturer liability despite lack of privity with the consumer be-
cause "it is the maker who creates the risk and reaps the profit."). See generally Cowan, supra
note 23, at 1087-92. This conclusion is also given as the first justification for strict products
liability among those listed in comment c of section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. c (1965).
25. The policy of distributing the costs of product injuries by holding the manufacturer lia-
ble serves to compel the manufacturer to take into account the real costs of the product. When
the manufacturer alters a product's price to cover the costs of the injuries caused by the product,
the price then demonstrates the product's true cost to society. See RAHDERT, supra note 19, at
33; Calabresi, supra note 18, at 505. This result is desirable because it allows consumers to better
appreciate the true costs of a particular product and consequently decide whether or not to
purchase it. See Calabresi, supra note 18, at 514. In contrast, if a product's price does not reflect
its societal costs, consumers will tend to purchase more of the product than they would if they
were aware of the product's true cost. See id.; see also Gilbert Sandier, Strict Liability and the
Need for Legislation, 53 VA. L. REV. 1509, 1511 (1967) ("[T]he present [liability] system, based
on the "fault" concept, understates the actual costs of products .... ").
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CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
that the manufacturer was negligent.26 Rather, the plaintiff need only
prove that the dangers of the product as marketed outweigh its util-
ity.2 7 Thus, the elimination of negligence doctrine is designed to in-
sure that the manufacturer remains responsible for the products it
sells, whatever the nature of the conduct that led to the promulgation
of the product.28 Moreover, there is a readily available mechanism for
the imposition of strict products liability: manufacturers can spread
the costs of the injuries caused by the product to the users of the prod-
uct generally, simply by raising the selling price to reflect compensa-
26. See, e.g., Aller v. Rodgers Mach. Mfg. Co., 268 N.W.2d 830, 834 (Iowa 1978) ("Proof of
the particular seller's or manufacturer's negligence in the making or handling of the product is
not required since the strict liability in tort doctrine eliminates ... negligence.").
27. See supra note 8.
28. In addition, a strict liability system grants consumers legal relief by eliminating the un-
fair financial obstacle of proving negligence on the part of the manufacturer. See Jeffrey
O'Connell, Balanced Proposals for Product Liability Reform, 48 Oino ST. L.J. 317, 319 (1987)
("Finding fault... is often an extremely expensive business in both simple and complex product
liability cases."); Cowan, supra note 23, at 1087.
[Vol. 72:189
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tion costs. 29 Strict products liability also arguably provides an
incentive for increased product safety.
30
29. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. One aspect of cost-spreading deserves indi-
vidual mention here: the problem presented by the incompatibility of cost-spreading with liabil-
ity for dangers unknowable at the time of manufacture or sale. The cost-spreading rationale,
which requires spreading the costs of injuries before those injuries occur, does not work particu-
larly well in the context of dangers unknowable at the time of sale because it is difficult to insure
against an unknowable risk, and impossible to spread the costs of an unknowable danger before
that danger materializes. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse
in Products Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 265, 274 (1990)
(arguing against imposition of strict products liability for unknowable risks because "manufac-
turers cannot... insure against risks that even reasonably careful persons do not know exist").
This fact alone cannot justify abolition of the doctrine, unless cost spreading was the only or
primary justification for the adoption of strict products liability in the first place, which it was
not. Cost spreading is a mechanism for implementing strict products liability, not a justification
for its existence. See Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in
Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1084 (1972) (fairness goal of strict products liability is achieved through
cost distribution). Indeed, when commentators suggest that strict products liability should be
abandoned because it lacks efficiency in regard to unknowable risks, they are reaching the incor-
rect conclusion that courts impose liability mainly out of economic considerations. See id.; see
also Ellen Wertheimer, Unknowable Dangers and the Death of Strict Products Liability: The
Empire Strikes Back, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 1183, 1186 (1992) ("[T]he choice to place liability on the
manufacturer is not dictated by economic theory alone."). In the process, these commentators
reveal their unwillingness to recognize the primary justification for the doctrine of strict products
liability-fairness. See Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 546 (N.J. 1982)
("When the defendants argue that it is unreasonable to impose a duty on them to warn of the
unknowable, they misconstrue both the purpose and effect of strict liability.... [I]f a product
was in fact defective, the distributor of the product should compensate its victims for the misfor-
tune that it inflicted on them."); see also John F. Vargo, Caveat Emptor: Will the A.L.I. Erode
Strict Liability in the Restatement (Third) for Products Liability?, 10 TOURO L. REV. 21, 32-33
(1993). Professor Vargo frames the issue in regard to unknowable risks: neither the manufac-
turer nor the consumer can discover the dangers so that "the only question remaining is one of
policy; who between these two innocent parties should bear the loss?" Vargo, supra, at 33.
Thus, strict products liability is based upon a policy decision that the manufacturer can bear the
loss better than the individual consumer. See infra note 31 (citing Judge Traynor). The doctrine
should attach because human life and well-being should not be subject to, and are more impor-
tant than, concerns about efficiency, even in those few instances where the risk was truly un-
known. For a further discussion of fairness as the basis behind the development of strict
products liability, see supra notes 21-23, 27 and accompanying text.
30. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 442 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concur-
ring) (stating that strict products liability advances the public interest in greater consumer pro-
tection because it makes the manufacturer "guarantee the safety of his product"); Turner v.
General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 853 (Tex. 1979) (Campbell, J., concurring) (indicating
that one reason that strict products liability is imposed is to encourage the manufacturer to "test
for and guard against" product risks); David G. Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Products
Liability, 33 VAND. L. REV. 681, 711-13 (1980) (claiming that the imposition of strict liability on
manufacturers promotes product safety by creating a financial incentive for manufacturers to
reduce the dangers of their products); cf. Mark M. Hager, The Emperor's New Clothes Are Not
Efficient: Posner's Jurisprudence of Class, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 7, 46 (1991) (arguing that strict
liability should be retained because market forces alone will not promote optimal product safety
as long as safety measures require greater expenses).
Negligence law arguably does an adequate job to encourage product safety: a manufacturer
which fails to adopt known safety devices is arguably negligent. See supra notes 15-17 and ac-
companying text. To the extent that strict products liability makes recovery by injured plaintiffs
easier, however, it can act as an incentive for safer products, because the plaintiff will not need to
prove negligence on the part of the manufacturer. See Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 363
A.2d 955, 958 (Md. 1976) (indicating that product safety is furthered more effectively through
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Strict products liability doctrine represents a societal judgment
that, as between a nonnegligent manufacturer and a nonnegligent
plaintiff, the loss should fall on the party responsible for the presence
of the product on the market: the manufacturer.31 In the majority of
cases, the manufacturer has performed a preliminary cost-benefit
analysis on the product, and has decided, in the face of that analysis,
to market the product. Since many products have the potential to
cause injury, the decision to market the product requires that the
manufacturer also decide that a certain level of risk to the consumer is
acceptable. Before any product is marketed, the manufacturer must
have decided that the risk level is one the manufacturer is willing to
accept. This risk, however, is not a risk to the manufacturer at all, but
a risk to the consumer. The manufacturer has decided that the prod-
uct involves a certain risk of harm to some consumers, and that the
product is worth selling anyway. In the following passage, Professor
Cowan points out the contradiction-indeed the unfairness-in al-
lowing the manufacturer to create a risk and then avoid paying for its
consequences:
Now the question arises, why should the manufacturer be allowed
to pass the so-called consumer's risk on to the consumer at all? Es-
pecially the risk of property loss or serious bodily injury arising
from a defective product? The answer of the manufacturer that he
must pass some risk on to the consumer is now met with the reply:
then pay for the damages. This is not absolute liability. It has noth-
ing to do with insurance. It has nothing to do with subjective fault.
It has to do with compensation for a loss resulting from a deliber-
ately assigned risk-assigned, that is, to the other fellow. 3
2
When the manufacturer assigns the risk of harm to the consumer, the
manufacturer should pay for the injuries caused by its decision. The
harm falls on the consumer; however, the costs of that harm should
not.
strict liability rather than negligence or warranty theories of recovery); Lynda J. Oswald, Strict
Liability of Individuals Under CERCLA: A Normative Analysis, 20 B.C. ENVWL As'F. L. REV.
579, 598 (1993) ("Strict liability increases the likelihood that the defendant will be held liable
and thus increases the incentive for the defendant to undertake measures to reduce the risks
associated with the product .... "). Yet this observation does not mean that the sole or main
reason for imposing strict products liability is to encourage the creation of safer products. See
supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing those authorities who mistakenly assume that
the main reason for imposing strict products liability is to encourage product safety).
31. Once a loss has occurred due to a product injury, one party must bear the loss, and the
manufacturer is generally in a better position to do so. See Escola, 150 P.2d at 441 (Traynor, J.,
concurring) ("The cost of injury and the loss of time or health may be an overwhelming misfor-
tune to the person injured, and a needless one, for the risk of injury can be insured by the
manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of doing business.").
32. Cowan, supra note 23, at 1091-92.
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The problem with this analysis, and with strict products liability
law generally, is that recovery by the injured consumer is limited to
recovery for injuries caused by defective products. This approach
does not go far enough. The fact that the manufacturer has assigned
the risk to the consumer has nothing to do with the defectiveness of
the product; it has to do with the risk assigned. If the product is dan-
gerous, the manufacturer has assigned the risk to the consumer. This
has nothing to do with whether the product passes the risk-utility test
or not. If it is appropriate to make the manufacturer pay for the risk
assigned to the consumer, then whether the product is defective or not
should be irrelevant.
As the law stands now, before a plaintiff can recover in strict
products liability, the plaintiff must prove that the product was defec-
tive, that is, that its costs outweighed its benefits. 33 The fact that the
product's benefits outweigh its costs, however, has nothing to do with
the assignment of risks in the product. Why should the fact that the
product is nondefective mean that the manufacturer is free to pass on
the risk to the consumer? The Cowan rationale for imposing liability
on the manufacturer of a defective product applies equally well to
dangerous nondefective products. The assigned risk of a dangerous
product is the same whether the product is defective or not, and the
arguments that justify imposing liability on the manufacturer of a de-
fective product work equally well when the product is dangerous but
nondefective.
Restricting liability to defective products makes a mockery of the
whole concept of cost-benefit analysis. If the utility of a product out-
weighs its costs, it means that the injuries the product will cause are
worth undergoing, from both the point of view of the consumers of
that product and of the manufacturer. It also means that the product
is not defective. Thus, the manufacturer, who has based its decision
on whether to produce the product on the fact that the benefits of the
product will outweigh its costs, will not have to pay for that portion of
the costs attributable to consumer injuries. In other words, after cal-
culating the costs of injuries the product will cause and using that
33. See Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 879 (Alaska 1979) ("A product must
be defective as marketed if liability is to attach ... "); see also Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., Inc., 709 P.2d
876, 881 (Ariz. 1985) (quoting Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033, 1036 (Or. 1974)
("To impose liability there has to be something about the article which makes it dangerously
defective without regard for whether the manufacturer was or was not at fault."); Phipps, 363
A.2d at 962 ("Although the plaintiff need not prove any specific act of negligence on the part of
the seller.. . proof of a defect.. . must still be presented."). For a discussion of the cost-benefit
analysis for determining whether a product is defective, see supra note 9.
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amount in deciding whether to produce the product, the manufac-
turer, if the calculations are correct, will not have to pay the amount
because the product is not defective. This sum then represents extra,
and in a very real sense unearned, profit to the manufacturer. If the
jury concludes that the manufacturer performed the weighing test cor-
rectly, the manufacturer will not have to pay the costs that the weigh-
ing process itself envisioned the manufacturer paying.
Thus, a strong argument can be made that the requirement of a
defect undercuts the validity of the weighing process through which all
products must go before they reach the market. This Article is more
limited in scope, however; this Article merely contends that consum-
ers should be compensated for injuries caused by certain unavoidably
dangerous products in the absence of a defect in the product.34 These
are dangerous, but nondefective, products, and with respect to certain
of these products the fairness rationale behind strict products liability
leads us further into the realms of true strict liability.35 "Where the
reason stops, there-stops the rule." However, where the reason ex-
tends, the rule should extend also.
II. UNAVOIDABLY DANGEROUS PRODUCTS THAT BENEFIT
SOCIETY GENERALLY
Products that benefit society generally at a substantial cost to a
few present the most compelling case for a change in the law to com-
pensate those who are injured. Products in this category include vac-
cines36 and other medicines which arrest the progress of contagious
diseases. It is in the interests of society to have as many people as
possible vaccinated against contagious diseases;3 7 indeed, many states
34. See discussion infra Parts II, III.
35. See discussion infra Parts II, III.
36. A vaccine is a medium containing a foreign substance that, when administered to the
patient, creates an immune system response against a particular disease. See S.A. Sturges, Com-
ment, Vaccine-Related Injuries: Alternatives to the Tort Compensation System, 30 ST. Louis U.
L.J. 919, 920-21 (1986) (citing J. KIMBALL, INTRODUCTION TO IMMUNOLOGY 9 (1983)). Typi-
cally, the substance used to elicit the immune response is a killed or inactivated form of the
actual virus or a strain of the virus that does not produce the disease. See id. at 921 & nn.13-14.
37. A specific disease is controlled most effectively when an extremely high percentage of
the general population is immune. See Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Federal Compensation for Vaccina-
tion Induced Injuries, 13 B.C. ENVTL. Aii. L. REV. 169, 208 (1986). This societal condition is
often termed "herd" immunity. See id. Experts believe that the existence of "herd" immunity
against a particular disease eliminates the possible development of an epidemic. See id.
Society as a whole benefits when a degree of "herd" immunity is achieved and the threat of
an epidemic is greatly reduced. With unavoidably dangerous vaccines, however, the individual
may then have an incentive to decline immunization in order to avoid the risk of injury or con-
tracting the disease. See PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CON-
SEQUENCES 182 (1988); Reitze, supra, at 208. This is because the individual may simply benefit
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have enacted statutes requiring that all children be vaccinated against
certain diseases before they are allowed to enter kindergarten. 38 Vac-
cinations cannot be made entirely safe,39 but even with their dangers
they are not defective because their utility outweighs the risks that
they involve.40 The problem lies in how to handle the injuries that
from the immunity of others. See HUBER, supra, at 182; Reitze, supra, at 208. Yet if many
people chose to behave in this manner, the goal of vaccinating as many individuals as possible
would be defeated, and society would not attain "herd" immunity. See Reitze, supra, at 208.
Hence society, through the government, often requires that individuals receive immunizations.
See id. The United States Supreme Court has explicitly recognized the right of the state to
subject an individual's liberty to the societal goal of immunity against a disease. See Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26, 35 (1905) (holding that "[tihere are manifold restraints to which
every person is necessarily subject for the common good" so that "the legislature has the right to
pass laws which, according to the common belief of the people, are adapted to prevent the
spread of contagious diseases").
38. Every state and the District of Columbia have mandatory immunization laws. See
Sturges, supra note 36, at 934 n.126. For examples of these laws, see GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-771
(1996); N.Y. PUBtUC HEALTH LAW § 2164 (McKinney 1995); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1303a
(West 1994).
A majority of the states have certain narrow exceptions to this rule for those whose religion
forbids vaccinations. See Okianer Christian Dark, Is the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act
of 1986 the Solution for the DTP Controversy?, 19 U. TOL. L. REV. 799, 799 n.3 (1988); e.g., N.Y.
PUBLIC HEALTH LAW § 2164(9).
39. See Mary Beth Neraas, Comment, The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986:
A Solution to the Vaccine Liability Crisis?, 63 WASH. L. REV. 149, 149 & n.3 (1988). Some of the
inevitable risks involved (despite proper preparation of the vaccine) are as follows:
Polio contracted from oral polio vaccine is estimated to occur once in 3.2 million doses,
leading to an estimated five cases each year. Encephalitis (swelling of the brain) fol-
lowing the administration of the diphtheria, tetanus, and pertussis ... vaccine is esti-
mated to occur 3.2 times per million doses, leading to an estimated 43.2 cases each year.
Encephalitis following measles vaccination is estimated to result in about 10 cases each
year. Deaths due to anaphylactic shock from all vaccines is estimated to be one in 10
million doses for a total of five to six cases each year.
Id. at 149 n.3 (quoting Vaccine Injury Compensation, 1984: Hearings on H.R. 556 Before the
Subcomm. on Health and the Environment, 98th Cong. 140 (1984) (statement of Dr. Alan R.
Nelson, Member, Board of Trustees, American Medical Ass'n)).
40. See Gregory C. Jackson, M.D., Pharmaceutical Product Liability May Be Hazardous to
Your Health: A No.Fault Alternative to Concurrent Regulation, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 199, 233 &
n.233 (1992). This Article deals solely with vaccines that are as safe as possible, that is, those for
which there is no safer, alternative design.
The current use of the Sabin oral polio vaccine is the result of a risk-utility decision. There
are two forms of polio vaccine. See Sturges, supra note 36, at 921 n.16. The Salk vaccine is
administered by injection, while the Sabin vaccine can be given orally to the vaccinee. See id.
Along with a more convenient administration, the Sabin vaccine also is believed to have the
advantage of longer effectiveness. See id. Yet, unlike the Salk vaccine, the Sabin vaccine con-
tains actual live polio viruses that lead to contraction of the disease in a few patients. See id.
Despite its known and serious risk, the Sabin polio vaccine is the form currently given in the
United States. See id. Therefore, public health officials made a decision that the ease of ad-
ministering the Sabin vaccine and its long-lasting effects outweighed its small, but inevitable risks
that are avoidable with the Salk vaccine. See Marc A. Franklin & Joseph E. Mais, Jr., Tort Law
and Mass Immunization Programs: Lessons from the Polio and Flu Episodes, 65 CAL. L. REV.
754, 766 (1977).
The overall benefits of immunizations are undeniable. See Neraas, supra note 39, at 149 n.2
(listing the dramatic decreases in the total occurrences of diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis, measles,
mumps, rubella, and polio since vaccination for those diseases became common). Indeed, the
vaccination efforts against smallpox were so successful that the disease has been eliminated
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inevitably result from the vaccination process.41 Under existing law,
manufacturers cannot be held liable for the injuries caused by vac-
cines because they are not defective. But in light of the societal bene-
fit that accrues from vaccinations and the statutory requirements that
persons be vaccinated, it seems appalling to leave the costs of injuries
from such vaccines where they fall.
The resolution to this problem lies in the reason for vaccinations
in the first place. Where a statute requires the vaccination, that stat-
ute stands as a statement by the relevant governmental authority that
the public interest mandates that the vaccination be administered.
42 It
therefore is highly unfair that the percentage of persons inevitably in-
jured by the vaccine are left to bear the cost. If vaccines are adminis-
tered in the name of society, then society should compensate those
who are injured by the vaccines. 43 This rationale extends beyond stat-
utorily mandated vaccines to all vaccines designed to enhance immu-
nity: society profits from the highest levels of immunity against the
most diseases possible, whether required by statute or not.
Thus, this Article proposes that those injured by vaccinations be
compensated for those injuries by the group that benefits from vac-
cinations: society generally. There is no basis for holding manufactur-
ers of the vaccines liable, because the vaccines, the utility of which
outweighs their dangers, are not defective.44 Nor is it appropriate to
leave the loss where it falls, upon the individual.45 Such a result is
throughout the world. See HUBER, supra note 37, at 182; David S. Fedson, M.D., Adult Immuni-
zation Summary of the National Vaccine Advisory Committee Report, 272 JAMA 1133 (1994).
Such a result is the goal of those who advocate mandatory immunization.
41. Deaths and adverse reactions to vaccines are uncommon. See supra note 40. Yet this
fact should not diminish the urgency involved in determining the most just and effective way to
assist those who fatefully suffer for society's benefit. See Sturges, supra note 36, at 919 ("Ad-
verse reactions to vaccines, although rare, must not be ignored by a responsible society.").
42. See supra note 38 (citing state statutes); see also Fay F. Spence, Note, Alternatives to
Manufacturer Liability for Injuries Caused by the Sabin-Type Oral Polio Vaccines, 28 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 711, 736 (1987) ("State legislatures already have made a policy decision in favor
of public health and against personal autonomy by requiring school children to be vaccinated
against polio.").
43. See Reitze, supra note 37, at 209 ("[Jiustice requires that those receiving the benefits of
having their fellow citizens vaccinated must share in the cost of caring for those whom fate or
malpractice has decreed will be victims.").
44. In other words, under a strict products liability analysis, the benefits of vaccines out-
weigh their costs. See supra note 8.
From a fairness standpoint, holding the manufacturer liable for a properly prepared vaccine
is problematic. In strict liability generally, the manufacturer decides to allocate risk to the con-
sumer. In the context of vaccinations, however, it is society, through legislative enactment, that
has decided to compel its membership to face certain dangers. See supra note 38 and accompa-
nying text.
45. Under current law, the loss remains with the individual in many instances. For those
vaccinees who attempt to sue the manufacturers, the explicit designation of a vaccine as an "un-
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completely arbitrary, since the only prediction that can be made is
that a given percentage will be injured by the vaccines, not who within
that group will be injured.46 Moreover, the individual has no real
choice whether to undergo the vaccination or not,47 especially where
state statutes require vaccines as a precondition to beginning school;48
avoidably unsafe" product in comment k of section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
often prevents recovery. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1977); see, e.g.,
Mazur v. Merck & Co., 964 F.2d 1348 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that vaccine falls within comment k
as "unavoidably unsafe"); Toner v. Lederle Lab., 732 P.2d 297 (Idaho 1987) (applying comment
k to diphtheria-tetanus-pertussis vaccine). Comment k is an exception to the strict products
liability rule of the Restatement (Second) for those products that are socially desirable yet "quite
incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965). Due to their great importance, the Restatement contends that such
products are not defective. See id.
The only way in which a plaintiff can recover for an injury caused by an "unavoidably un-
safe" product is to demonstrate that the product was prepared improperly or contained inade-
quate warnings. See id. In these cases, the focus of the inquiry is the reasonableness of the
manufacturer's behavior. See Mazur, 964 F.2d at 1354 (stating that vaccine supplier was not
subject to strict liability but must exercise reasonable care); see also Johnson v. American Cyana-
mid Co., 718 P.2d 1318 (Kan. 1986) (evaluating reasonableness of manufacturer's warning on
polio vaccine). Hence, the practical effect of comment k is to require plaintiffs to prove manu-
facturer negligence when the product involved is deemed "unavoidably unsafe". See Ferrigno v.
Eli Lilly & Co., 420 A.2d 1305, 1318 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980) (stating that comment k
rules are "merely rules of negligence embodying the long-standing concepts of lack of due care
and foreseeability of the risk"). Limiting recovery only to those occasions in which the manufac-
turer is at fault is particularly tragic in the vaccination context where a serious injury can occur
despite proper preparation of the vaccine. See supra note 39; e.g., Johnson, 718 P.2d at 1323-24
(holding that parent who acquired poliomyelitis from child given polio vaccine cannot recover
from manufacturer if product is unavoidably unsafe with known, reasonable risks); White v.
Wyeth Lab., Inc., Nos. 52108, 52564, 1987 WL 14953 *7 (Ohio Ct. App. July 30, 1987) (child with
brain damage from DTP vaccine denied recovery because comment k applied to vaccine and
manufacturer's warning was reasonable).
46. For the rates of injury, see supra note 39.
47. See Sturges, supra note 36, at 928 (indicating that alternatives for most of the required
vaccines do not exist).
The mandatory aspect of receiving these vaccinations, combined with the benefits of immu-
nity, render any assumption of the risk argument baseless. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Simons, As-
sumption of Risk and Consent in the Law of Torts: A Theory of Full Preference, 67 B.U. L. REV.
213, 276 (1987). Professor Simons argues that "in those strict liability cases in which [the] de-
fendant cannot make the product or condition safer, it may be especially clear that [the] plaintiff
fully preferred the risk." Id. Yet, assumption of the risk only works as a defense where an
individual voluntarily decides to confront a known danger. See, e.g., Rush v. Commercial Realty
Co., 145 A. 476 (N.J. 1929). Even after a warning of the vaccine's risks, the vaccinee does not
have the right to decline receipt of the vaccination. See supra note 38. Moreover, an individual
is reasonable in seeking immunity from diseases such as polio. Thus, any assumption of the risk
argument would be met by the response that reasonable assumption of the risk is not a defense.
See Young v. Aro Corp., 111 Cal. Rptr. 535, 537 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973) (denying application of the
assumption of risk defense when plaintiff acts reasonably); Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So. 2d 287
(Fla. 1977) (holding that reasonable assumption of risk does not bar recovery); Cartel Capital
Corp. v. Fireco, 410 A.2d 674 (N.J. 1980) (holding that only voluntary and unreasonable assump-
tion of risk serves as defense in strict liability). Indeed, if the recipient is unreasonable in decid-
ing to undergo the vaccination, surely the manufacturer is unreasonable (and therefore
negligent) in providing the vaccination in the first place.
48. See supra note 38 (citing state statutes).
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thus, leaving the loss on the individual penalizes that person for obey-
ing the law. 49
The only entity that can fairly compensate the injured individual
in this category is the government.50 This is because the population
generally benefits from the highest proportion of immunity possible.51
Therefore, either state or federal governments should set up a funding
system that will fully compensate all those injured in the name of the
greater good of mankind. While the federal government has made
limited efforts in this direction in the form of the National Childhood
Vaccine Injury Act of 1986,52 this statute is woefully inadequate in
every respect, including the ends it seeks to accomplish, the means to
those ends, the vaccines to which it applies, the injuries it covers, and
the entities it taxes.53
49. The penalties that a recipient may face for compliance with the law can include death or
a serious adverse reaction such as encephalitis. See supra note 39 (identifying rates of major
adverse reactions to vaccines).
50. See Reyes v. Wyeth Lab., 498 F.2d 1264, 1294 n.57 (5th Cir. 1974) ("It can also be
argued, of course, that since all society benefits from universal immunization against infectious
disease, the loss should be borne by the local, state or federal government."); see also Sturges,
supra note 36, at 934 ("[A] government that requires its citizens to be immunized should also
provide compensation to those who are injured by required immunization."). Allowing recovery
from the government would end the inequities that were produced when the courts held a manu-
facturer liable or denied an injured vaccinee compensation for failure to prove negligence. See
supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
51. For a discussion of the benefits of a high percentage of immune individuals within the
general population, see supra note 37.
52. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-10 to -34 (1994).
53. The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 ("the Act"), 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-10
to -34 (1994), was not intended primarily as a vehicle for compensation at all. Rather, Congress
specifically passed the Act to address the problem of decreasing vaccine supplies caused by man-
ufacturer withdrawals from the market. See Victor E. Schwartz & Liberty Mahshigian, National
Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986: An Ad Hoc Remedy or a Window for the Future?, 48
OHIno ST. L.J. 387, 388-89 (1987). For this reason, the Act does not adequately address the goal
of achieving greater compensation for injured vaccinees by requiring that society pay the costs
involved.
The Act's coverage is limited to adverse reactions to only three designated groups of vac-
cines. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-14(a) (DTP; measles, mumps, and rubella; and polio). Yet states
often require vaccinations against additional diseases prior to admission in school. See, e.g.,
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 322.8 (Deering 1995) (influenza type b); N.Y. PuBtac HEALTH
LAW § 2164 (McKinney 1995) (hepatitis B and hemophilus influenza type b); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 32.1-46 (Michie 1994) (hepatitis B and hemophilus influenza type b). Vaccinees injured due to
the unavoidable side effects of these mandatory vaccines, therefore, are not within the purview
of the statute.
Moreover, an individual seeking compensation under the Act must show that a particular
injury or death occurred within a specified time period. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-14(b). Although
some form of time limitation is arguably necessary, a rigid enforcement of the Act's time periods
or injury requirements may defeat what should be the greater objective: compensating those
obviously harmed by a vaccine. See, e.g., Hodges v. Secretary of Dep't of Health and Human
Servs., 9 F.3d 958 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (denying compensation to parents whose child died less than
four hours after DPT inoculation because parents failed to prove death resulted from particular
adverse reaction designated in the Act). These requirements can make proceedings under the
Act no different (or no less difficult) than a tort lawsuit. See id. at 963, 968 (Newman, J., dissent-
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Governmental compensation for all vaccinations and injuries
caused by their competent administration will accomplish more than
protecting injured consumers. If such a system is enacted, it can re-
place lawsuits against manufacturers. Arguably, it is appropriate as
the law now stands for plaintiffs to lose lawsuits against manufacturers
based on the administration of a nondefective vaccine. But even if the
plaintiff loses, the threat of such lawsuits is oppressive for manufactur-
ing). As a result, dissatisfaction of injured vaccinees with the Act has led to a recent increase in
appeals of rejected claims and, more significantly, lawsuits against manufacturers. See Robert L.
Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Efficacy of a Mass Toxics Administrative Compensation Scheme, 52
MD. L. REV. 951, 960 n.53 (1993); Carole A. Loftin, Note, Expansion of the Government Con-
tractor Defense: Applying Boyle to Vaccine Manufacturers, 70 TEx. L. REV. 1261, 1268 & n.58
(1992).
By allowing injured vaccinees the option to reject the Act's recovery scheme and initiate a
civil suit against the vaccine manufacturer, the Act essentially defeats itself. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 300aa-21(a) (permitting party to file civil action for damages after judgment under the Act is
rendered). Proponents of the Act argue that this option is not a problem because the Act pro-
vides disincentives to tort actions. See Dark, supra note 38, at 849. Indeed, the Act does modify
state tort law to some extent in the manufacturer's favor. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-22 (barring civil
recovery for injury or death caused by unavoidable side effects of vaccine; creating presumption
of proper warnings if manufacturer complied with federal labelling laws; barring recovery based
upon failure of manufacturer to directly warn recipient). Yet, as long as the Act does not serve
as the exclusive means of recovery, lawsuits against the manufacturers will continue. See Rabin,
supra; Loftin, supra. Although many of these civil actions will fail due to the enhanced restric-
tions on tort law contained in the Act, manufacturers will nonetheless be forced to endure the
expenses of defending a civil lawsuit. This result will consequently limit the extent to which the
Act can fulfill its main purpose: reducing the legal expenses of vaccine manufacturers so as to
guarantee an adequate vaccine supply. See Schwartz & Mahshigian, supra.
Limitations on who may sue under the Act also pose a problem. The Act prevents those
who have received an award or settled an action for damages from a vaccination injury or death
from suing. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(c)(1)(E). This provision thus bars those parties who
sought compensation before Congress passed the Act from bringing a claim, even if the party
accepted a minor settlement that fell far short of adequate compensation. See Theodore H.
Davis, Jr. & Catherine B. Bowman, No-Fault Compensation for Unavoidable Injuries: Evaluating
the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 16 U. DAYTON L. REV. 277, 310-
11 (1991) (discussing Wiggins v. Secretary of Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 17 C1. Ct. 551
(1989), affd, 898 F.2d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). In the process, the provision favors those individu-
als who originally did not sue for their injuries and later chose to seek compensation under the
no-fault scheme of the Act. See id.
Individuals who do succeed in attaining compensation under the Act may find that certain
provisions of the statute limit their recovery. In particular, the Act grants the estate of a vaccine
recipient killed by an adverse reaction a set amount of $250,000. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(a)(2).
In addition, for those individuals who must live with their vaccine-related injury, the Act limits
the damages available to them for actual and future pain, suffering, and emotional distress to
$250,000. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(a)(4). By placing restrictions such as these on recovery, the
Act may foreclose the chance that some injured recipients (or their estates) will truly attain full
compensation for their damages.
The most fundamental flaw of the Act is its failure to force society to pay for the injuries
caused by mandatory vaccinations. As it stands, the Act requires that any compensation pay-
ments be made from a trust fund. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(i)(2). The money available in this
trust fund, however, is collected from specified excise taxes placed on the vaccines. See 26
U.S.C. § 4131(a)-(b) (1994). This taxation scheme, therefore, does not tax all of society as it
should. See Sturges, supra note 36, at 945-46. Instead, the scheme places the costs of the vac-
cines where they were before-on either the manufacturer or the vaccinee. See id.
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ers. In any event, not all such lawsuits are lost. In the absence of a
governmental decision as to which injuries will be compensated, the
jury decides whether a vaccination is defective or not on a case-by-
case basis. Sometimes the jury or court decision is wrong, in the sense
that a plaintiff recovers for a dangerous, but not defective, vaccina-
tion.54 A governmental compensation system can avoid this problem
by designating which vaccines are covered, and by replacing tort liabil-
ity. Manufacturers also contend that the threat of lawsuits, whether
ultimately successful or not, stifles the development of new vaccines,
thereby harming society generally. This argument would completely
lose any force it has if there were an exclusive governmental compen-
sation system.55
In the absence of a system whereby government compensates in-
jured vaccinees directly, the next best alternative would be to impose
the costs of injuries on manufacturers. In the absence of legislative
action, the courts could accomplish this themselves through changes
to the existing law of strict products liability. This would at least
spread the costs somewhat, and over a long period of years would
operate similarly to governmental compensation. Spreading the costs
to all persons undergoing the vaccination ultimately spreads the costs
to all of society over a long enough period of time. It would be far
more efficient, however, and possibly fairer to manufacturers, to enact
a governmental system to accomplish directly what it would otherwise
take years to accomplish: the compensation of vaccination injuries by
society as a whole.
III. UNAVOIDABLY DANGEROUS PRODUCTS USED BY SOME
MEMBERS OF SOCIETY
The products in this category are dangerous but so useful that
their utility outweighs the risk they bring with them. The dangers in-
herent in these products cannot be entirely eliminated by careful use,
by a change in design, or by the development of an alternate product.
Their utility, however, makes them reasonably dangerous.
54. For a discussion of the confusion between dangerous and defective products, see Ellen
Wertheimer, Azzarello Agonistes: Bucking the Strict Products Liability Tide, 66 TEMP. L. REV.
419, 437-38 (1993).
55. The mechanism for such a system is beyond the scope of this Article. Clearly, the gov-
ernmental entity would need to designate the vaccines covered by the statutory scheme. The
system would also need fully to compensate injured plaintiffs, and would need to be exclusive.
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As with vaccines, the products in this category are not defective
because their utility outweighs their dangers.5 6 But the dangers re-
main, and a certain percentage of persons who use these products
competently will be injured by them.5 7 One example of such a prod-
uct is the ladder.5 8 Ladders remain dangerous even if used nonneg-
ligently. They cannot be designed so as to eliminate their dangers, but
are so useful that their complete absence from the marketplace would
pose a substantial hardship.5 9 Ladders do not rise to the level of soci-
etal necessity that vaccines do, but are nonetheless too useful to be
eliminated entirely (indeed, that is the basis for finding them
nondefective).
Again as with vaccines, and assuming no negligence on the part
of the consumer, it seems highly inappropriate to leave the loss where
it has fallen.6° This is because, in a very real sense, those who are
56. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the cost-benefit analysis
for determining "defectiveness," see supra note 8.
57. See Malcolm E. Wheeler, In Pinto's Wake, Criminal Trials Loom for More Manufactur-
ers, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 6, 1980, at 30 n.10. For a discussion of the problem created by these prod-
ucts that have significant utility but still cause inevitable harm, see Michael B. Metzger,
Corporate Criminal Liability for Defective Products: Policies, Problems, and Prospects, 73 GEO.
L.J. 1, 39-40 (1984). Metzger indicates that attempts to reduce the unavoidable injuries of such
products often make the products too expensive or unsafe in other ways. See id. at 39-40 &
nn.250-51.
58. Another group of products which falls into this category is therapeutic prescription
drugs (in other words, prescription drugs used to cure specific conditions, as opposed to vac-
cines). A defective drug, one the utility of which does not outweigh its dangers, should be
treated just as any other defective product is treated. But even nondefective prescription drugs
bring undesirable side effects with them. Since no governmental body has shown itself willing or
able to establish a health care system that would compensate those injured in the name of the
continued availability of such drugs, the tort system should step in to do so. Of course, the
simplest system would be to have manufacturers spread the costs of the drugs to all users thereof
by charging an amount for the drug that leaves enough to compensate those injured by its use,
thus treating such products as though they were defective.
For information on ladders and the like, see Wheeler, supra note 57. Indeed, there is a
wealth of similar products for individual outdoor use. Chain saws, lawn mowers, and the like
embody dangers which cannot be entirely eliminated. See id. (listing other common household
products that inevitably create injuries to users). But such products are distinguished from vac-
cines because all members of society do not benefit equally from their availability, and no statute
requires their use. See supra note 37 (discussing vaccinations and general, societal benefit of
immunity from dangerous diseases); supra note 38 (citing state statutes that make vaccination
prerequisite to mandatory school attendance). Instead, the consumers who buy these particular
products benefit from their availability.
59. Obviously, the dangers that products like ladders embody can be minimized by the use
of safety features and directions. However, the dangers cannot be eliminated entirely.
60. The loss, however, often does remain with the user of these products. What effectively
prevents these plaintiffs from obtaining compensation is their inability to prove such products
defective. See Sandier, supra note 25, at 1510 ("[T]he numerous victims of non-defective danger-
ous products.., must frequently bear their own losses because the present law specifies a prod-
uct defect as a prerequisite to recovery."); see also Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the
Possible End of the Rise of Modern American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REv. 601, 630-31 (1992). As
an example, Schwartz states that over 417,000 knife injuries occur each year that result in hospi-
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injured in the competent use of the products in this category are pay-
ing the price of the general availability of these products to all those
who need or use them.61 The dangers inherent in the use of such
products will fall on some users; tolerating them is a price that all
users should pay. "If a certain type of loss is the more or less inevita-
ble by-product of a desirable but dangerous form of activity it may
well be just to distribute such losses among all the beneficiaries of the
activity .... "62
How to accomplish this goal is the next question. The products in
this category are not defective because their utility outweighs their
dangers. Thus, there is no basis in strict products liability law for im-
tal visits. See Schwartz, supra, at 630. Yet Schwartz points out that few if any claims are brought
against knife manufacturers because the defect requirement will foreclose recovery. See id. at
630-31. Thus, a knife that is sharp and intended to cut is not likely to be found defective when it
cuts a user. Instead, the user must bear the injury alone. Additionally, the knife will not be
found defective because its danger is considered inherent in the device itself. See id. at 630. This
"inherent danger" argument is another way in which recovery is denied to consumers injured by
these unavoidably dangerous products. See, e.g., Todd v. Societe Bic, S.A., 21 F.3d 1402, 1407
(7th Cir. 1994) (quoting Hunt v. Blasius, 384 N.E.2d 368, 372 (Il1. 1978)) (denying recovery to
father of child killed in fire started by cigarette lighter lacking child-resistant feature because
"[i]njuries are not compensable in products liability if they derive merely from those inherent
properties of a product which are obvious to all who come in contact with the product").
61. See Keeton, supra note 2, at 856 ("Thus there has come about a wider acceptance for
the view that when the benefits to the many come at a high cost to the few, the many should pay
for these losses.").
There are those who would argue that ladder-users are assuming the risk of any dangers
inherent in their use, and should therefore be barred from recovery. These individuals may
concur in Professor Owen's view of the accident victim:
[E]ven a "passive" accident victim may be considered the responsible "cause" of the
harm he suffered. This is because the victim... made a series of deliberate choices...
at some time prior to the accident that were necessary antecedents to its eventuality.
Nothing inherent in the victim's mere "passivity" at the precise moment of the accident
is a shield from bearing moral responsibility for the intended or foreseeable conse-
quences of such prior choices.
Owen, supra note 20, at 452 (footnotes omitted). While it may be true that ladder-users choose
to confront known dangers, this fact should not affect the result here. Reasonable assumption of
risk has never operated as a defense. See supra note 47 (discussing assumption of the risk and
inappropriateness of the doctrine's application to vaccination injuries). An individual who elects
to use a ladder and who acts competently in doing so is acting reasonably. If that were not the
case, then the argument could be made that the manufacturers are acting unreasonably in mak-
ing ladders available in the first place. If the choice to use a ladder is a reasonable one, then
assumption of the risk is not available as a defense. If this were not the case, and if the choice to
use the ladder were unreasonable, then one might well argue that the manufacturer's decision to
make the ladder is likewise unreasonable. This is the same argument that would meet a fast-
food chain seeking to use an assumption of the risk argument in defending itself against a con-
sumer who has been burned by coffee sold through a drive-through window. If a consumer acts
unreasonably in purchasing coffee at a drive-through window, the fast food facility which sells
the coffee in such a manner is likewise acting unreasonably by selling the coffee.
62. HARPER & JAMES, supra note 11, § 13.2, at 763. Here, however, it is a product rather
than an activity that is unavoidably dangerous yet desirable. Therefore, those individuals who
benefit from the availability of the nondefective product, the entire group of the product's con-




posing liability on the manufacturer. 63 But requiring that those who
are injured bear the burden for all those who need or use these prod-
ucts is likewise unfair.64
One way to handle the problem is to create what amounts to an
insurance fund for all those who use the products in this category.65
This would require that all who purchase ladders (for example) pay a
surcharge, which would then be pooled by the manufacturer into a
fund for the compensation of those who are injured while competently
using ladders.66 Essentially, this amounts to treating ladders as
though they were defective for the purpose of compensating the inju-
ries they cause. The traditional justifications for strict products liabil-
ity apply to nondefective products as well as to defective ones, as long
as a vehicle exists that allows the manufacturers to spread the costs to
consumers of the product.
One problem that would immediately arise is that not all users of
ladders are also purchasers of ladders. 67 The fund would need to com-
63. In other words, these products are not defective. See David G. Owen, Problems in
Assessing Punitive Damages Against Manufacturers of Defective Products, 49 U. Cm. L. REV. 1,
16 (1982). Professor Owen correctly indicates that the manufacturer of these nondefective prod-
ucts should not be held liable simply because the manufacturer is aware with statistical certainty
that the products will cause injuries. See id.
64. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (discussing unfairness of forcing individual
who competently used product to bear consequences of injury).
65. Professor James noted that a form of insurance available to compensate injured persons
is the more appropriate way of dealing with accidental injuries or injuries not attributable to
fault. See Fleming James, Jr., Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance,
57 YALE L.J. 549, 569 (1948). Likewise, an insurance fund would better assist those consumers
who cannot recover for their losses because the product that injured them was nondefective. See
Marshall S. Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer Protection: Doctrine, Function and
Legal Liability for Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L. REV. 1109, 1376 (1974) ("Such a system
would eliminate inequality of treatment for the victims of various kinds of fortuitously caused
harms .... "). Indeed, nondefective products which create a identifiable number of injuries are
ideal for the loss-spreading effect of insurance. See Schwartz, supra note 60, at 631 ("[T]he
larger the number of foreseeable injuries, the more important . . . loss distribution . . . be-
comes."). But see Owen, supra note 30, at 706-07 (asserting that private health insurance, "free
medical care on a welfare basis," and workers' compensation are better methods for taking "the
economic sting out of accidental injuries.").
66. Compare Sandier, supra note 25, at 1517, who argues that a tax should be added to the
prices of certain desirable products that cause unavoidable accidents. This tax would force those
who purchase (and benefit from) the product to pay for the injuries that the product creates. See
id.
67. Pro-defense commentators would also argue that eliminating the defect requirement
will force "occasional product users ... [to] pay for the injuries suffered by product abusers."
James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the American Products Liability Frontier:
The Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1263, 1313 n.188 (1991); see also
Owen, supra note 30, at 707 (stating that such an insurance plan would "penalize the prudent
consumer.., by forcing him to pay again through higher prices to overinsure himself and also to
insure his less prudent neighbors."). Such fears, however, are misplaced here. As indicated




pensate such users as well as purchasers. But this problem does not
defeat the idea. Although it might arguably lead to a higher than war-
ranted surcharge on purchasers (because the purchaser would be pay-
ing a surcharge to cover not only the purchasers, but also other users)
the loss would still fall more equitably than it would were it left on the
injured party. It is indisputably true that this system would cause
price increases. However,
[i]t is crucial ... to keep in mind that this [surcharge] is paying to
alleviate the hardship and distress of people who suffer injuries.
Yes, it raises prices. But the higher prices ensure that we pay close
to the true social costs of the goods and services we enjoy. We
could buy things more cheaply by refusing to compensate vic-
tims.... But then the low costs would represent a subsidy we enjoy
at the expense of suffering victims-unless, of course, we find our-
selves among the victims. 6 8
Moreover, those who purchase ladders for use by their employees al-
ready pay a surcharge for their use in the form of workers' compensa-
tion insurance.69
Essentially, the result of the above system would be that the
products in this category would be treated just as defective products
are already treated. The manufacturer, by imposing a surcharge,
would spread the costs of the injuries inflicted by the products to
68. Mark M. Hager, Civil Compensation and Its Discontents: A Response to Huber, 42
STAN. L. REV. 539, 545-46 (1990) (reviewing PETER W. HUBER, LIABILrrY: Tim LEGAL
REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1988)).
69. Another type of product which is not designed for individual use but which might use-
fully be viewed as belonging to this category is represented by the escalator. See, e.g., Hunt v.
City Stores, Inc., 387 So. 2d 585, 588 (La. 1980) (indicating that certain type of injury is likely to
occur with escalators despite modem design and conformity with safety standards). The pro-
posed system for compensation could deal with products purchased for the use of others in
either one of two ways. The purchaser of the escalator (a department store, mall, or the like)
could agree with the manufacturer to indemnify the manufacturer for all injuries caused to the
actual nonnegligent users of the escalator. In the alternative, the purchaser could simply pay a
surcharge which would cover the same costs as the indemnification was designed to cover. The
department store owning the escalator in Hunt was held liable for the injury it caused. See id.
Yet, in imposing strict products liability on the store, the court deemed the escalator defective
simply because the injury involved in Hunt was "an unusual occurrence in itself which would not
have happened had [the] escalator not been defective." Hunt v. City Stores, Inc., 375 So. 2d
1194, 1196 (La. Ct. App. 1979), amended by and affd, 387 So. 2d 585 (La. 1980) (quoting Mar-
quez v. City Stores Co., 371 So. 2d 810 (La. 1979)). Rather than distorting strict liability law and
struggling to find a product defective despite the product's proper design and conformity with
safety standards as the Hunt court did with the escalator, the proposed system acknowledges that
some products are not defective but still do create injuries. Adoption of the system would then
avoid the problem created by the current law requiring a finding of a defect in order to allow the
plaintiff to recover. Instead, the system would stand for the principle that the costs of the inevi-
table injuries should be borne by those parties who benefit from the product's availability-the
store and its clientele.
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those who purchase them, and would use this money to compensate
injured consumers.70
The system proposed here will have several results. The first is
that it will fairly distribute the costs of a product which benefits a
broad spectrum of society. Those unlucky enough to fall into the in-
evitable percentage of consumers injured by the product will be com-
pensated for their injuries in the name of allowing the product to be
available generally. It seems counterintuitive to weigh the costs of a
product against its utility, and then to decide that the loss will lie
where it has fallen simply because the product's costs are outweighed
by its benefits. The consumer is in no position to spread the costs. It
seems inappropriate to preclude cost-spreading, and to leave the loss
on the individual, where a broad spectrum of society benefits from the
availability of a particular product. Indeed, such a situation cries out
for cost-spreading, but the very usefulness of the product prevents the
losses from being shared by those who benefit from the product's
availability. Such a result is untenable and would be avoided by re-
quiring that the losses from such products be shared.
A second benefit from this system lies in the fact that it will re-
duce resorting to the courts in cases which fit the criteria for compen-
sation. Given that the losses under discussion here are not
compensated under the current tort system, the government must act
to set up the solution proposed here. Such governmental action
should include an exclusivity provision as well as a list of the products
covered. A solution which insures deserved compensation but which
reduces the transaction costs that litigation imposes surely deserves
consideration. 71
A third benefit lies in the greater legal clarity that will inhere in
providing uniformity and certainty of result. Some cases will continue
to end up in the courts. In the past, courts have had to resort to sub-
terfuges in order to compensate consumers in cases where justice re-
quires compensation but the law, literally applied, would not.72
Where the facts mandate compensation but the law does not, courts
wrestle with the need to make the law serve the common sense needs
of the judicial system. These wrestling matches lead to an increase in
litigation, both by encouraging plaintiffs to file lawsuits in the hope of
70. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing superior position of manufacturer
as loss allocator).
71. See RAHDERT, supra note 19.
72. See, e.g., Hunt v. City Stores, 387 So. 2d 585 (La. 1980). For a discussion of the Hunt
decision, see supra note 69.
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recovery or settlement, and by providing an incentive to defendants to
fight liability tooth and nail because the possibility that defendants
will not have to pay damages exists. The subterfuges in which the
courts engage to lead to the socially appropriate finding of liability
promote a lack of certainty of result that further stimulates litigation
because the parties will have no incentive not to fight the case to the
end. A lack of certainty increases transaction costs, and thus is to be
avoided if possible. The system proposed here creates a close to abso-
lute certainty of result and channels funds to injured parties, not into
transaction costs. Because the scheme will include a list of covered
products, the courts will no longer have to try even the question of
whether a product is defective or not. The temptation to find a prod-
uct defective, even if its utility outweighs its costs, in order to provide
compensation, consequently will be eliminated.
IV. UNAVOIDABLY DANGEROUS PRODUCTS THAT FAIL THE
RISK-UTILITY TEST
Products that fail the risk-utility test applied to all products are
defective. Unavoidably dangerous defective products should be
treated no differently. Thus, the products in this category constitute
perhaps the easiest of the three categories to handle. Strict products
liability law, if interpreted correctly, already covers them.73
Unavoidably dangerous products embody risks that cannot be
eliminated by the adoption of an alternative reasonable design. I have
argued elsewhere that the lack of an alternative reasonable design
should in no way affect the risk-utility weighing process applied to all
products nor its conclusion. If the utility of a product is outweighed
by its dangers, the manufacturer should be liable for the injuries
caused by the product because that product is defective. These are
products "for which no alternative exists" and which are "so danger-
ous and of such little use that under the risk-utility analysis, a manu-
facturer would bear the costs of liability of harm to others. '74
73. See supra note 9.
74. Aaron D. Twerski, A Moderate and Restrained Federal Product Liability Bill: Targeting
the Crisis Areas for Resolution, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 575, 588 (1985) (quoting O'Brien v.
Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298, 306 (N.J. 1983); see also Marshall S. Shapo, In Search of the Law of
Products Liability: The ALI Restatement Project, 48 VAND. L. REV. 631, 663-64 (1995) ("[O]ne
should be prepared to call defective any product that is likely to cause damage beyond its mea-
surable utility, without reference to possible design alternatives."); Ellen Wertheimer, The
Smoke Gets in Their Eyes: Product Category Liability and Alternative Feasible Designs in the
Third Restatement, 61 TENN. L. REv. 1429 (1994). Dispensing with an alternative reasonable
design requirement recognizes "the inarguable fact that there are products that are unavoidably
unsafe but which cannot be redesigned to eliminate the hazard." Wertheimer, supra, at 1435; see
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A substantial number of products liability scholars and defense
attorneys contend that a product should only be ruled defective if
there was an alternative available design which would have eliminated
the danger and which the manufacturer failed to adopt.75 Of course, if
there were such an alternative available, the manufacturer would be
liable under a negligence theory for acting unreasonably, and strict
liability would be unnecessary.76 But putting that aside, it seems
Carl T. Bogus, War on the Common Law: The Struggle at the Center of Products Liability, 60 Mo.
L. REV. 1, 45 (1995) ("Some products impose undue risks on society-at-large despite the best
possible design, construction, and warnings."). Some, such as vaccines and ladders, are unavoid-
ably unsafe but also are not defective because their utility outweighs their risks. See supra Parts
II-III. Thus, traditional strict products liability should not attach for these products. Others, on
the other hand, are unavoidably dangerous and fail the risk-utility test. The cigarette is an excel-
lent example of such a product. See J.D. LEE & JOHN F. VARGO, PRODUCTS LIABILITY PRAC-
TICE GUIDE § 42.07[4]-[6] (1996) (recognizing practical impossibility of a "safer cigarette");
Wertheimer, supra, at 1443.
For a discussion and criticism of those commentators who argue that a plaintiff must demon-
strate the availability to the manufacturer of a reasonable, alternative design in order to recover,
see infra notes 75-80 and accompanying text.
75. See, e.g., Harvey M. Grossman, Categorical Liability: Why the Gates Should Be Kept
Closed, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 385, 390-91 (1995) (equating requirement of feasible design alterna-
tive with "traditional defect doctrine"); James A. Henderson, Jr., The Efficacy of Organic Tort
Reform, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 596, 610-11 (1992) (book review) (supporting view that courts
"should require plaintiffs complaining of risky product designs to prove the availability to de-
fendant of a feasible, cost-effective alternative at the time of distribution"); Theodore S. Jankow-
ski, Focusing on Quality and Risk: The Central Role of Reasonable Alternatives in Evaluating
Design and Warning Decisions, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 283, 323-24 (1995) (stating that "[a]lternative
availability" must be "a prerequisite to risk-utility balancing" to prevent "the manufacturer from
becom[ing] an insurer of the product"); Gary T. Schwartz, Foreword: Understanding Products
Liability, 67 CAL. L. REV. 435, 468 (1979) (discussing need for "some design alternative ... that
can serve as the basis for a risk-benefit analysis"); Twerski, supra note 74, at 588-89 (arguing that
requiring plaintiff to compare product with alternative is necessary to prevent "a frightening
liability picture").
Due to the efforts of the pro-defense consensus, a section of the proposed Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability includes a requirement that the plaintiff show the existence
of a "reasonable alternative design" that would have reduced the product-induced injury. RE-
STATEMENT (Ti.nD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABItraY § 2(b), at 13 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1995).
For a discussion of this new requirement in the Restatement, see David G. Owen, Defectiveness
Restated: Exploding the "Strict" Products Liability Myth, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 743 (1996); Frank
J. Vandall, The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability Section 2(b): The Reasonable
Alternative Design Requirement, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1407 (1994). Refuting the claims of the Re-
porters for the Restatement (Third), Professor Vandall demonstrates that the majority of courts
do not currently require the plaintiff to present evidence of a reasonable alternative design as an
element of the plaintiffs prima facie case. See id. at 1408-21. Moreover, Vandall illustrates how
the requirement contradicts the policies that underlie strict products liability. See id. at 1421-24;
see also John F. Vargo, The Emperor's New Clothes: The American Law Institute Adorns a "New
Cloth" for Section 402A Products Liability Design Defects-A Survey of the States Reveals a
Different Weave, 26 MEMPHIS L. REV. 493 (1996) (cases cited by Reporters to third Restatement
do not support the changes in the third Restatement).
76. Focusing on the manufacturer's design choices in light of an alternative design shifts the
inquiry to considerations of reasonableness that are associated with negligence. See Hager,
supra note 68, at 561 (pointing out that requiring proof of a design alternative "is tantamount to
finding negligence in the choice to implement the inferior design instead of its feasible alterna-
tive"); Vargo, supra note 29, at 23-42 (asserting that adding a reasonable alternative design re-
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ironic in the extreme that many of those who argue for this approach
are economists who normally support allowing the market to operate
as freely as possible.77 The irony lies in the fact that in this one arena,
that of so-called product category liability,78 these economists are un-
willing to allow market forces to operate.79 If cigarette manufacturers
quirement is "simply a return to negligence"); Wertheimer, supra note 29, at 1243 (1992)
(indicating that "the alternative feasible design doctrine transforms products liability law into a
negligence-based doctrine" because "[tihe doctrine asks whether it was feasible to redesign the
product").
Not surprisingly, the pro-defense legal scholars and the defense attorneys who are develop-
ing the Restatement (Third) are well aware of what the reasonable alternative design require-
ment does to products liability law. See RESTATEMENT (TaiD) OF TORTS: PROUuCrs LIABtUTY
cmt. c (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1995) (stating that the requirement is the standard that is "also
used in administering the traditional reasonableness standard in negligence").
Returning design defect liability to negligence standards is highly undesirable from the in-
jured consumer's perspective. First of all, the change would mean that plaintiffs would once
again face the daunting evidentiary (and thus financial) obstacles of a negligence claim. See
Rahmig v. Mosley Mach. Co., 412 N.W.2d 56, 81 (Neb. 1987) ("A requirement that a plaintiff
prove feasibility [of alternatives] ... in a case based on strict liability . . . is restoration of the
exact burden to be avoided by the doctrine of strict liability in tort for a product's design de-
fect."); see also supra note 28 (discussing the benefits to the consumer of eliminating a negli-
gence standard). Furthermore, a reasonable alternative design requirement will exempt
unavoidably unsafe, low-utility products from the scope of strict liability. See Wertheimer, supra
note 74, at 1442-43. In particular, existing case law demonstrates that such an exemption will
occur with dangerous products such as cigarettes. See Kotler v. American Tobacco, 926 F.2d
1217 (1st Cir. 1990), vacated, 505 U.S. 1215 (1992) (refusing to hold tobacco company liable for
cigarettes under risk-utility test unless alternative feasible design is shown). For a discussion of
the application of the risk-utility test to cigarettes, see infra note 84 and accompanying text.
77. See infra note 79.
78. Product category or generic liability is defined as manufacturer liability for products
that "remain unreasonably dangerous despite the best possible construction, design and warn-
ings" because the products "have a greater social cost than social benefit." Bogus, supra, note
74, at 8. Product category liability can attach despite the lack of proof of an alternative reason-
able design. See Wertheimer, supra note 74, at 1440. For a discussion of the debate surrounding
product category liability, see infra note 79.
79. Instead of directly asserting their unwillingness to allow the market to operate, these
commentators disguise their opposition in arguments that product category liability is an anom-
aly of strict products liability law. See Grossman, supra note 75, at 397 (addressing product
category liability cases as deviations from "traditional" products liability); Henderson & Twerski,
supra note 67, at 1263 (associating product category liability with non-traditional "liability with-
out defect"). The fallacy of these arguments is that product category liability holds the manufac-
turer liable for a nondefective product. To the contrary, product category liability is the result of
the risk-utility analysis conducted to determine defectiveness. See Wertheimer, supra note 74, at
1439-40 (stating that the product must still undergo the risk-utility test). If an unavoidably un-
safe product has more utility than costs, it is not defective. See supra Parts II-III. But if a
product, such as a cigarette, fails the test, why should liability not attach as with other products?
It is here that these commentators argue that the requirement of an alternative feasible design,
the method of eliminating product category liability, is a component of traditional design defect
analysis. See Grossman, supra note 75, at 391 (stating that "traditional defect doctrine" places
the presence of a reasonable alternative design at "the threshold of analysis"). Granted, some
jurisdictions do require the plaintiff to show the existence of a feasible design alternative before
the plaintiff can recover. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.56 (West 1991) (obligating the
plaintiff to demonstrate the existence of alternative feasible design at time product left defend-
ant's control to recover on design defect theory); Habecker v. Clark Equip. Co., 942 F.2d 210,
215 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that design cannot be "defective" unless an "alternative feasible
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(for example) were compelled to pay the costs of their product by
compensating those injured by the availability of cigarettes, the price
of cigarettes would rise.80 This effect of compensating those injured
by cigarettes would allow market forces to operate and "is the best
way to decide if the activity is worth having."'' l If the price rose to a
point at which no one bought them any more, then manufacturers of
cigarettes would stop selling them. If the price did not rise sufficiently
to make cigarettes unprofitable, then manufacturers would continue
to produce and sell them. As has been eloquently stated, "[a] manu-
facturer is free to employ a process even if it occasionally kills or
maims if he is able to show that consumers want his product badly
design existed when the product was manufactured"). But these jurisdictions do not constitute a
majority. See Vandall, supra note 76 (discussing cases). More significant, there is nothing tradi-
tional about a reasonable alternative design requirement in defect analysis. First of all, the most
influential work of modem products liability, section 402A of the Restatement (Second), does not
place a burden on the plaintiff to prove the existence of a reasonable alternative design. See
Wertheimer, supra note 74, at 1429 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965)).
In addition, a requirement that returns design liability to negligence standards betrays the pur-
poses behind strict products liability and is anything but traditional. See authorities cited supra
note 76 (stating that reasonable alternative design doctrine brings design defect analysis back to
negligence-based liability); supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text (illustrating that strict
products liability law was created for greater consumer protection and thus does not focus on
amount of care exercised by manufacturer).
Opponents of product category liability (and strict products liability in general, for that
matter) may relish the inclusion of a reasonable alternative design requirement in the proposed
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability and the document's explicit rejection of categori-
cal liability. RESTATEMENT (TtuRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY, § 2(b) cmt. c (Tentative
Draft No. 2, 1995); see ALl Hesitates on Lawyer Liability, Product Liability Restatement Efforts,
62 U.S.L.W. 2734, 2736 (May 31, 1994) (quoting Professor Aaron Twerski) (stating that reason-
able alternative design requirement of Restatement (Third) will apply even to unavoidably dan-
gerous products such as tobacco and alcohol). Yet as Professors Henderson and Twerski, the
Reporters to the Restatement (Third), have correctly indicated, "[clourts are free to disagree
with restatement positions and do so with considerable frequency." James A. Henderson, Jr., &
Aaron D. Twerski, Will a New Restatement Help Settle Troubled Waters: Reflections, 42 AM. U. L.
REv. 1257, 1263 (1993). Certainly, for the sake of those individuals who will be injured by un-
avoidably unsafe, defective products, one can only hope that most courts will recognize the fal-
lacy underlying the reasonable alternative design requirement and choose to reject the
Restatement (Third).
80. In other words, the costs of the product's injuries would become a part of the cost of
production. This result is one of the goals of strict products liability. See Escola v. Coca Cola
Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944) (stating that the costs of the injuries that the product
creates can become "a cost of doing business"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt.
c (1965) ("[Plublic policy demands that the burden of accidental injuries caused by products...
be treated as a cost of production .. "). For the smoker, the higher price of a pack or carton of
cigarettes would more accurately reflect the product's actual costs. See Windle Turley & Cliff
Harrison, Strict Tort Liability of Handgun Suppliers, 6 HAMLINE L. REV. 285, 291 (1983)
("Through higher consumer prices . . . the true product cost to society is ... known."). In
general, this result is favorable because it allows a consumer to make a more informed choice
when purchasing a product. See Calabresi, supra note 18, at 514.
81. Guido Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault Allocation of
Costs, 78 HARv. L. REV. 713, 718 (1965); see O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298, 306 (N.J.
1983) (indicating that "the cost of liability.., might dissuade a manufacturer from placing the
product on the market").
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enough to enable him to compensate those he injures and still make a
profit."82
Such a system would allow the market freely to operate: cigarette
manufacturers would be paying the true costs of their product, and the
marketplace would decide the question of continued production. Ex-
empting cigarette manufacturers from paying the true costs of their
product constitutes a subsidy of that product in the form of staggering
health care, industrial, and other costs the product generates. The
costs of cigarette smoking fall not only on smokers themselves, but
also on society generally. It is unusual, to say the least, to find those
who advocate a free market system supporting such a direct subsidy to
industry.
The products that fall into this category are defective, and their
manufacturers should pay for the injuries they cause. The fact that
there is no alternative feasible design that would eliminate the danger
does not justify treating these products differently from any other de-
fective product.83 To the contrary, the products in this category com-
82. Calabresi, supra note 81, at 717. Of course, deaths from cigarette smoking can hardly
be classified as occasional, but the quotation remains apt. See Richard A. Posner, A Theory of
Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 33 (1972) ("When the cost of accidents is less than the cost of
prevention, a rational profit-maximizing enterprise will pay tort judgments .... ). Product cate-
gory liability, therefore, does not necessarily remove the product from the market, and it is not
simply a form of "judicial outlawry" or "product prohibition," as it has been described. See
Grossman, supra note 75, at 386, 391. Rather, product category liability is imposed because
there is no legitimate reason to deviate from the policies behind true strict products liability or
create an exception to the rule just because a product is unavoidably dangerous and defective.
See supra note 79.
Strict products liability shifts the costs of the injuries that a particular product causes to the
manufacturer and consumers of that product. Using the cigarette example, this means that to-
bacco companies and smokers would pay for the costs that cigarettes create. See Bogus, supra
note 74, at 51 (stating that "[t]he real question is whether the costs of tobacco-related diseases
should be borne by those who benefit from tobacco or by society-at-large" and that "there is
strong sentiment that tobacco companies and smokers should bear those costs"). As it stands
now, of course, cigarette manufacturers are heavily subsidized by nonsmokers. Passive smokers
pay higher premiums and general health expenses to cover costs generated by exposure to ciga-
rettes. See Larry Margasak, Proposed Curbs On Smoking Gain Key Endorsement, PHILA. IN-
OUIRER, Feb. 8, 1994, at A3 (stating that nonsmokers pay $1.5 to $3 billion in earnings and health
costs a year due to passive smoke). Government agencies are charged with paying the medical
costs of those smokers who cannot afford them. See Bogus, supra note 74, at 51. These costs
consequently reach all taxpayers through Medicaid or Medicare. See id. Overall, all nonsmoker
adults of a working age pay around $100 extra in taxes and health-care premiums each year to
cover medical care for smokers. See Kenneth E. Warner, Ph.D., The Economics of Smoking:
Dollars and Sense, 83 N.Y. ST. J. OF MED., 1273-74 (1983). In addition, employers endure higher
absentee rates generated by cigarettes. See Thomas D. MacKenzie, M.D., et al., The Human
Costs of Tobacco Use (Second of Two Parts), 330 NEW ENG. J. MED. 975, 975 (1994) ("Cigarette
smokers are absent from work approximately 6.5 days more per year than nonsmokers."). The
Office of Technology Assessment concluded that smoking in 1990 created some $47 billion in
lost worker productivity and earnings. See id.
83. See supra notes 74-79.
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bine the highest danger level with the lowest utility of any products.84
They are so dangerous that their dangers cannot be reduced, and they
possess no societal utility to counterbalance their risk of injury.
CONCLUSION
Strict products liability was designed in part to remove the moral
element of fault from certain cases by eliminating the need for the
injured consumer to prove negligence on the part of the manufacturer.
It also was designed to introduce into tort law a different moral propo-
sition: that when dangerous products are placed on the market, those
who derive profit and benefit from the products should pay for the
accident costs those products generate. Unfortunately, the courts
were not ready for the idea that liability should exist in the absence of
fault, and persisted in reinjecting fault concepts into the cases before
them. This has led to the erosion of strict products liability and has
profoundly interfered with its capacity to fulfill the goals it was
designed to meet.
This Article has proposed that strict products liability be allowed
to serve the purposes for which it was developed. The goal of strict
products liability is to compensate those injured by products in the
manner least likely to produce unfair results. In the case of a defec-
tive product, it makes sense to impose liability on the manufacturer
and to base that liability on the nature of the product, not on the con-
duct of the manufacturer. If the product is defective and causes in-
jury, what difference does it make that the manufacturer was or was
not negligent, where the manufacturer is the party who has profited
from the availability of the product?
In the case of nondefective, dangerous products, there is no de-
fect to justify imposing the cost on the manufacturer. But there is
likewise no way to justify imposing the cost on the nonnegligent con-
sumer, except the fortuity that that consumer happened to be injured.
Dangerous nondefective products by definition have passed a risk-
utility test, and the bases for concluding that they pass the test also
justify shifting the costs of the injuries they cause onto the groups to
whom the product is useful. This Article simply proposes doing just
that.
84. See Gilboy v. American Tobacco Co., 582 So. 2d 1263, 1264 (La. 1991) ("Since normal
use of cigarettes causes lung cancer, the risk from smoking cigarettes is enormous, while its
utility is virtually nil."); Bogus, supra note 74, at 49 ("Do cigarettes fail a risk-utility test? The
answer unequivocally must be yes.").
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